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vraag syrie maar ![]() en alsof het hezbollah daarom te doen is ![]() Ja, alleen nu. Want nu past het in hun straatje. |
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Nu is dat als mede-bezetters ook niet echt raar, ze hebben er motief voor, en Ahmedinedja van Iran zou nooit enige actie tegen Syrië toestaan, maar ja, dan dus ook niet de Hezbollah de hand boven het hoofd houden als ze andere landen proberen binnen te vallen. Citaat:
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__________________
"Republicans understand the importance of bondage between a mother and child." - Dan Quayle
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Arbour must go
Alan M. Dershowitz, National Post Published: Friday, July 21, 2006 The absurdity and counterproductive nature of current international law was proven once again by a bizarre statement issued on Wednesday by Louise Arbour, The UN's High Commissioner for Human Rights and a former justice of the Canadian Supreme Court. She threatened "personal criminal responsibility" against Israeli generals and political leaders -- "those in positions of command and control" -- for the military actions they are taking to protect innocent civilians from Hezbollah and Hamas rocket and missile attacks. Her theory of prosecution is that the shelling of cities could "constitute a foreseeable and unacceptable targeting of civilians," presumably even when the actual targets are terrorists and their rocket launchers, and when the Israeli air force takes extraordinary steps to minimize civilian casualties. She also erroneously stated that international law prohibits "the bombardment of sites with alleged military significance, but resulting invariably in the killing of innocent civilians." Arbour's knowledge of international law is as questionable as her understanding of morality. Virtually every democratic nation has been forced to bomb cities during wartime, especially when the enemy locates crucial military targets near population centres. Under Arbour's erroneous criteria for criminal prosecution, U.S. presidents Bush, Clinton, Nixon, Johnson, Eisenhower, Truman and Roosevelt, as well as British prime ministers Blair and Churchill, and numerous French, Russian, Canadian and other heads of state would be declared war criminals for causing the "foreseeable" deaths of civilians while bombing legitimate military targets. Moreover, terrorists would be encouraged to launch their missiles from cities, so as to induce democracies to violate international law by counter-attacking terrorists. International law is not quite as silly and one-sidedly against democracies as Arbour makes it out to be. Military targets located in cities can be attacked so long as reasonable efforts are made to minimize civilian casualties. Indiscriminate carpet bombing of cities with no military targets is prohibited, except possibly in instances of belligerent reprisal for attacks on one's own cities. In fact, the entire system of nuclear deterrence that prevented the Cold War from turning into a nuclear conflagration was based on mutual threats of belligerent reprisals -- i.e. if the Soviet Union bombs New York, The United States will bomb Moscow. Current international law fails to answer the following questions: What is a democracy supposed to do when a terrorist enemy -- sworn to its genocidal destruction -- launches anti-personal missiles designed to maximize civilian casualties, and launches them from civilian population centres? Are they supposed to simply do nothing and let the missiles rain down on their own cities? Are they supposed to send in ground troops, as Israel did in Jenin, with considerable loss of life on both sides? May they conduct air attacks targeting the missile launchers or the terrorists and their arms depots, even though some civilians will "foreseeably" be killed? When terrorists use civilians as human shields, it is the terrorists who are criminally responsible for the "foreseeable" deaths of the civilian shields. Arbour may have missed the criminal law class in which this issue was considered, but Canadian law -- like the law of all civilized nations -- holds the bank robber, not the policeman guilty of murder, when the robber takes a hostage and the policeman kills the hostage in an effort to stop the robber from shooting at innocent bystanders. The same should be true of international law. Moreover, the entire question of who is a combatant is unclear in the context of terrorist groups that use "civilians" to hide their rockets and then use them as willing human shields. International law, and those who administer it, must understand that the old rules -- written when uniformed armies fought other uniformed armies on a battlefield far away from cities -- are now being used as shields and swords by the terrorists, who cynically manipulate the protected status of "civilians." Arbour will surely respond that she meant to include Hezbollah and Hamas leaders among those who should be subjected to criminal prosecution along with the Israelis. But her nominally neutral comments mask the fact that there is an enormous difference between terrorists who seek to maximize civilian casualties and democracies that seek to minimize them. Moreover, as Arbour knows full well, terrorist leaders cannot realistically be subjected to criminal prosecutions because they are underground, while democratic leaders live and travel openly. Louise Arbour is part of the problem, not part of the solution. She should be replaced as High Commissioner for Human Rights before she does even more harm to the ability of democracies to combat terrorism within the rule of law. http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/n...d-c0dafe419125 |
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Hmm,....
David Koppel, 21 juli 2006: "United Nations an Accomplice in Hezbollah Kidnapping: After Hezbollah's kidnapping of a pair of Israeli soldiers spurred an Israeli counter-attack, many critics of Israel actions have suggested that the United Nations can serve as a buffer between Israel and Hezbollah. To the contrary, the United Nations has a well-established record of collaboration with Hezbollah in the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been deployed since 1978, not long after Israel first entered Lebanon in pursuit of PLO terrorists. UNIFIL was created pursuant to Security Council Resolution 425, for the purpose of "confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area." Quite obviously UNFIL has utterly failed to achieve the Security Council's objectives, either before or after Israel's 2000 complete withdrawal from Lebanon. One reason is that UNIFIL does not interdict Hezbollah attacks on Israel. Instead, UNIFIL allows Hezbollah to set up positions next to UNFIL units, in effect using UNIFIL as human shields against Israeli counterstrikes. (Aluf Benn, Israel accuses UN of collaborating with Hezbollah," Haaretz, Sept. 11, 2005.) UNIFIL's most notorious collaboration with terrorists involved the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli soldiers, and the subsequent cover-up. On October 7, 2000, Hezbollah terrorists entered Israel, attacked three Israeli soldiers on Mount Dov, and abducted them Lebanon. The kidnapping was witnessed by several dozen UNIFIL soldiers who stood idle. One of the soldier witnesses described the kidnapping: the terrorists set of an explosive which stunned the Israeli soldiers. Clad in UN uniforms, the terrorists called out, "Come, come, we’ll help you." The Israeli soldiers approached the men in UN uniforms. Then, a Hezbollah bomb detonated—-apparently prematurely. It wounded the disguised Hezbollah commander, and three Israeli soldiers. Two other terrorists in U.N. uniforms dragged their Hezbollah commander and the three wounded soldiers into a getaway car. According an Indian solider in UNIFIL who witnessed the kidnapping, "By this stage, there was a big commotion and dozens of UN soldiers from the Indian brigade came around." The witness stated that the brigade knew that the kidnappers in UN uniform were Hezbollah. One soldiers said that the brigade should arrest the Hezbollah, but the brigade did nothing. According to the Indian soldier, the UNFIL brigade in the area "could have prevented the kidnapping." "I’m very sorry about what happened, because we saw what happened," he said. Hezbollah "were wearing our uniforms and it was too bad we didn’t stop them." It appears that at least four of the UNIFIL "peacekeepers," all from India, has received bribes from Hezbollah in order to assist the kidnapping by helping them get to the kidnapping spot and find the Israeli soldiers. Some of the bribery involved alcohol and Lebanese women. The Indian brigade later had a bitter internal argument, as some members complained that the brigade had betrayed its peacekeeping mandate. An Indian government investigation sternly criticized the brigade's conduct. There is evidence of far greater payments by Hezbollah to the UNIFIL Indian brigade, including hundreds of thousands of dollars for assistance in the kidnapping and cover-up. The UN cover-up began almost immediately. Lebanon's The Daily Star reported the story told by a former officer of the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL), which is part of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). ("UN 'destroyed' evidence after abduction of 3 Israeli troops," The Daily Star, July 20, 2001.) A few hours after the kidnapping, UNTSO learned that two abandoned cars had been discovered. One was a white Nissan Pathfinder with fake UN insignia; it had hit an embankment because it was being driven so fast that the driver missed a turn. The other was a Range Rover; it was missing a tire rim, and was still running when it was discovered. Rather than using the very-recently-abandoned vehicles as clues to rescue the kidnap victims, the UN initiated a cover-up. The next morning, eighteen hours after the kidnapping, a team of OGL and the Indian UNIFIL began removing the contents of the cars. The Range Rover was soaked with blood. Among the contents of the vehicles may have been a cell phone belonging to the terrorists. The UNTSO officer confirmed that the cars contained "extremely sensitive" items which included "current and relevant information that could have been easily linked to the incident." A UNIFIL peacekeeper videotaped the removal of the contents, and attempted to tow one of the cars. According to a much-later U.N. report, there were fifty items taken from the car, seven of them blood-stained. (Report of the fact-finding investigation relating to the abduction of three Israeli soldiers on 7 October 2000 and subsequent relevant events, Aug. 2, 2001.) The end of the UNIFIL videotape featured armed Lebanese men confronting the UN forces, and taking the cars away from the UN. The UN personnel did not resist, because, they later claimed, the cars did not belong to the UN anyway. The UNTSO officer told The Daily Star that the UN ordered its personnel to destroy all photographs and written reports about the incident. The U.N. did not provide the Israelis with the automobile contents, or the videotape, both of which might have helped the Israelis rescue the kidnap victims. Instead, the seized contents of the cars were taken to a town in Lebanon, stored in a safe, and some were eventually returned to Hezbollah. Israel found out about the videotape, and demanded that the UN let Israeli investigators see it. Kofi Annan and his Special Envoy denied that any videotape existed. It is not clear whether Annan was lying, or whether he was misled. Nine months after the kidnapping, July 6, 2001, the UN admitted that is had the videotape. Annan ordered an internal UN Report, which was led by UN undersecretary-General Joseph Connor. (Connor was later implicated in the Oil-for-Food scam.) The report revealed that the UN had two additional videotapes—one of which contained still photographs from the kidnapping itself. The UN investigation declared that there was no evidence that the UNIFIL forces had been bribed, or that the UN had deliberately misled anyone. Even after admitting the existence of the first videotape, Annan refused to allow Israel to view it. He claimed that letting Israel see evidence about the kidnapping would undermine the UN’s neutrality. Thus, Annan insisted on neutrality between innocent victims and terrorists who had used fake UN insignia and who had taken vehicles from UN staff a gunpoint. The United States House of Representatives, on July 30, 2001, passed by a vote of 411-4 a resolution urging the UN to allow Israel to see the videotape. Annan relented, but only under the condition that the tape be edited so as to hide the faces of the Hezbollah perpetrators. He also agreed to give the Israelis some, but not all, of the items which the UN had seized from the getaway cars. On January 29, 2004, the bodies of the murdered Israelis were returned to Israel by Hezbollah, as part of a prisoner exchange." |
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Wat lul je nou weer? Ik heb niet gezegt dat Hezbollah geen raketten gelanceerd heeft arogogant ventje, ik zeg dat die bullshit die jij lult over qassam raketten bullshit is, want die hebben ze neit en nooit gehad. Qassam zijn van Hamas, dus als je weer eens leest over een qassam die ergens inslaat, dan moet je neit gaan roepen, zie je wel, Hezbollah, want die hebben die raketjes niet, en nooit gehad. EN again, het is een feit dat Hezbollah na de terugtrekking van Israel geen burger doelen aangevallen heeft. Israel aan de andere kant, vind het de normaalste zaak een land compleet in puin te leggen. Er zullen best wapen depots zijn in hezbollah land, maar ik geloof er geen zak van dat Beirut er vol mee ligt. Zolang ik geen enkel stukje bewijs daarvoor zie geloof ik ook geen snars ervan. |
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Dat is echt niet alleen Israels policy hoor. Elk land of gebied waar de pijlen op gericht zijn, zijn voorzichtig met het leveren van informatie over dat land en/of gebied. Anders kun je net zo goed meteen je doelen rood verven zo van: raak mij! |
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Maar zoals ik al zei: het is Hezbollah echt niet te doen om die lullige boerderijen. Die geven geen fuck om Libanon. |
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Ik hou er van mn dag te beginnen met wat fictie. Ga ik nu weer over naar realiteit. |
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Inhoudelijk reageren? Ok; het is beide onzin. Arbour die moet gaan? Omdat ze zegt dat Israel burgers bestookt? Is toch een feit of niet soms? Dat 2e stukje is al helemaal een mooi stukje onbewezen fictie. Ja, je hebt humor lieve Gatara. Knap weer hoe je keer op keer weer fictie als feiten presenteerd, zonder ook maar enige vorm van bewijsvoering te tonen. |
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Opinie
Jenin massacre syndrome Just like the spring of 2002, the international press prefers hype to facts After a lot of hesitancy and a short-lived attempt to take balanced positions, the worldwide left-wing has returned in full force to the "Jenin massacre syndrome." To remind: Many of the worlds leading journalists described the fighting in Jenin during the spring of 2002 as a cold-blooded massacre of thousands of Palestinians by the brutal IDF. TV screens around the world featured Palestinian "eyewitnesses," who gave exact details of blood-curdling actions by IDF soldiers that never happened. TV reporters reported against a background of destroyed buildings as "evidence" from the field that Israel had mercilessly flattened an entire city and the refugee camp next to it. It took months for human rights organizations, even the United Nations, to issue their reports refuting Palestinian claims. There was no massacre in Jenin, no ethnic cleansing, no intentional destruction of hospitals. There was a bloody battle in which soldiers died on each side. Learning the lessons The fairytale about the "Jenin massacre" may have died, but were lessons learned? Some were. The European media, especially the electronic media, has given some expression to the suffering of Israeli civilians under attack. It has not (usually) supported Hizbullah. But in other cases, no lessons were learned from the blood libel of the Jenin massacre. During the second week of fighting, Israel's military campaign in Lebanon is currently being portrayed as the total destruction of Lebanon, of essential civilian infrastructure, as a human tragedy on the level of the 2004 tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands of people in Southeast Asia. Reading reports from left-leaning field reporters, one gets a picture that Beirut has been destroyed at least as badly as Dresden was during the Second World War. Foreign television channels use one section of footage over and over, showing the destruction of one neighborhood in south Beirut, to "show" what has happened throughout the city. The most worrying thing about the current anti-Israel wave is its' global scope: Leaders and opinion makers around Latin America, for example, have denounced Israel in some of the strongest terms imaginable. The UN Human Rights Commission has joined the chorus, as have international law organizations, cinema types, even journalists. These claims, unfortunately, rest on the arrogant statements and bragging of several Israeli politicians and generals. Threats to "bomb Lebanon fifty years backwards" – statements intended for domestic consumption, and perhaps as part of the psychological warfare against the enemy – were picked up and broadcast by the world media as proof of Israel's destructive intentions. The facts And where is the truth in all this? The air force's bombing of Lebanon have caused, as always happens in war, damage and destruction, but this damage has been extremely limited. Israel has not "kicked Lebanon's ass," nor is there any intention to do so. In Beirut, to date, the airport has been hit, as have several strategic targets and buildings in the Shiite Quarter. That's a far cry from the descriptions of horror being played out nightly on television screens, and of charges of war crimes. The situation in south Lebanon is worse because of the planned civilian flight. But Hizbullah has turned the whole of south Lebanon into a war zone, by blurring the distinction between military and civilian areas. The organization also aims its rockets at Israel's civilian population. Thus, civilians were forced to flee both southern Lebanon and northern Israel. Still, talk of a "Lebanese nakba," a humanitarian disaster that any honest person would feel revulsion about, fails to reflect reality. It is no more than horror propaganda that many prefer to believe, including many Israeli journalists. Analysts repeat the claims without verifying the facts, and preach moral lessons and philosophies based on these claims. More than numbers The numbers, of course, don't tell the whole story: The death of even one innocent person is a terrible tragedy, and 50,000 refugees is an appalling horror. But statistics do have a public relations value. As of this writing, some 360 Lebanese have been killed by Israeli military action, about half of them Hizbullah fighters (as opposed to official Lebanese statistics). After two weeks of bombing, these numbers tell the story of low-level war. There is no "destruction of Lebanon," just like there was no "Jenin massacre." In 2006, because of the mistaken approach that "the world is with us," because of the different character of the fighting and psychological and diplomatic reasons, the facts have been abandoned. This is a mistake, one that works against Israel with opinion makers around the world. (07.23.06, 13:46) http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7...280038,00.html |
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Is dat een feit? Sinds wanneer? Militaire doelen waarbij per ongeluk burgers om het leven komen tellen niet. Citaat:
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Militaire doelen op het vliegveld? Die zijn er niet. GSM-masten als militair doel? Dat bestaat niet. Wat is het volgende? Electriciteitscentrales (Hezbollah gebruikt immers ook electriciteit)? Drinkwater (Hezbollah moet toch ook drinken)? De lucht (Hezbollah moet ook ademen)? Kennelijk trap je volledig in de Israelische propaganda dat er 'per ongeluk' burgers om het leven komen. En wie ben jij om te bepalen dat zoiets niet telt? |
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2. je kunt in een oorlog niet vermijden dat onschuldige burgers om het leven komen. Wanneer snap je dat nu eens eindelijk? |
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Ooit de film "A bridge too far" bekeken? Doe maar eens. Dat laat wel zien hoe belangrijk bruggen eigenlijk zijn. |
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2. Tuurlijk wel. Alleen maar op militaire doelen schieten zou al veel helpen. Citaat:
Het enige wat ermee bereikt wordt is dat de burgers nergens meer naar toe kunnen. En dan ook nog het gore lef hebben om pamfletten te strooien met de oproep dat de burgers het gebied moeten verlaten. Vertel mij eens, hoe moeten ze dat doen als de volledige infrastructuur is platgebombardeerd? Oh, en is Hezbollah nu opeens een leger geworden? |
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wat een kulredenatie. Alsof er logisch uit volgt dat als iemand op een knopje drukt er met opzet burgers gedood worden; ook als ermee een anti-tank raketlancerings apparaat mee geraakt wordt. Heb jij ueberhaupt wel eens ooit eens een realistisch oorlogsspelletje gespeeld op de computer? Op gare computergames na, schiet je daarbij op burgers? Citaat:
Dat blijkt ook. Hezbollah-acties schijnen in kracht af te nemen, maar ze zijn nog steeds sterk. Citaat:
De aanvoer van wapens uit Syrie en andere landen is zowat stopgezet. Nu moet het leger waarschijnlijk inderdaad een grondoorlog aangaan om "het laatste karwei" af te maken. Citaat:
Ben blij dat ze gewaarschuwd worden. Trouwens, niet dat iedereen wegwilde. Maar ach, Israel kan het toch nooit goed doen. Ik heb niets anders verwacht. Citaat:
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En grondoorlog? Gaan ze dan Libanon in zijn geheel bezetten? Of gaan ze gericht de lanceerinstallaties/whatever aanvallen in het zuiden van Libanon? Ik hoop dat Libanon steun krijgt van Syrie, de SCO en de VN op het moment dat Israel Libanon binnentrekt, zodat Libanon toch nog genoeg kracht heeft om Israel buiten zijn landsgrenzen te houden. Citaat:
Daarnaast waarschuwt Israel alleen maar om aan de rest van de wereld te laten zien dat ze aan de burgers denken, en dat aanhangers de acties goedkeuren 'omdat de burgers zijn gewaarschuwd'. De mensen kunnen simpelweg niet weg, omdat de volledige infrastructuur is vernietigd. Citaat:
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__________________
"Mijn psychiater zegt dat ik schizofreen ben. Wij vinden van niet!"
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Opzettelijk? (volstrekt logische redenatie?) |
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Laatst gewijzigd op 23-07-2006 om 20:42. |
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Het doel van de Israëlische raketten of bommen is de Hezbollah uit te schakelen, niet burgers. Dat Libanon dat zelf niet heeft gedaan heeft denk ik met angst te maken, menig tegenstander van Syrië of Hezbollah heeft dat met de dood moeten bekopen. Ze zaten dus met een verdeeld land, ze negeerden het alleen. En nu mag Israël het vuile werk opknappen. Laatst gewijzigd op 23-07-2006 om 21:56. |
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The Sunday Times July 23, 2006
God's army has plans to run the whole Middle East Hezbollah, the group at the heart of the Lebanese conflict, is the spearhead of Iran’s ambitions to be a superpower, says Iranian commentator Amir Taheri ‘You are the sun of Islam, shining on the universe!” This is how Muhammad Khatami, the mullah who was president of Iran until last year, described Hezbollah last week. It would be no exaggeration to describe Hezbollah — the Lebanese Shi’ite militia — as Tehran’s regional trump card. Each time Tehran has played it, it has won. As war rages between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Tehran policymakers think that this time, too, they can win. “I invite the faithful to wait for good news,” Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said last Tuesday. “We shall soon witness the elimination of the Zionist stain of shame.” What are the links between Hezbollah and Iran? In 1982 Iran had almost no influence in Lebanon. The Lebanese Shi’ite bourgeoisie that had had close ties with Iran when it was ruled by the Shah was horrified by the advent of the clerics who created an Islamic republic. Seeking a bridgehead in Lebanon, Iran asked its ambassador to Damascus, Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, a radical mullah, to create one. Mohtashamipour decided to open a branch in Lebanon of the Iranian Hezbollah (the party of God). After many meetings in Lebanon Mohtashamipour succeeded: in its founding statement it committed itself to the “creation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon”. To this end hundreds of Iranian mullahs, political “educators” and Islamic Revolutionary Guards were dispatched to Beirut. Within two years several radical Shi’ite groups in Lebanon, including some with Marxist backgrounds, had united under the Hezbollah name and became the main force resisting the Israeli occupation of Lebanon after the expulsion of Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1983. Terror has been its principal weapon. Throughout the 1980s Hezbollah kidnapped more than 200 foreign nationals in Lebanon, most of them Americans or western Europeans (including Terry Waite, the Archbishop of Canterbury’s envoy). It organised the hijacking of civilian aircraft and more or less pioneered the idea of suicide bombings against American and French targets, killing almost 1,000 people, including 241 US marines in Beirut and 58 French paratroopers. The campaign produced results. After Hezbollah’s attacks, France reduced its support for Saddam Hussein. America went further by supplying Iran with TOW anti-tank missiles, shipped via Israel, which helped to tip the Iran-Iraq war in favour of Iran. In exchange Iran ordered Hezbollah to release French and American hostages. Once the Iran-Iraq war was over, Tehran found other uses for its Lebanese asset. It purged and then reshaped Hezbollah to influence the broader course of regional politics while using it to wage a low-intensity war against Israel. In 2000, when the Israelis evacuated the strip they controlled in southern Lebanon, Tehran presented the event as the “first victory of Islam over the Zionist crusader camp” and Hezbollah was lauded across the Arab world. Hezbollah taunted the Israelis with billboards on the border reading, “If you return, we return”. To prop up that myth, Tehran invested in a propaganda campaign that included television “documentaries”, feature films and books and magazine articles. The message was simple: while secular ideologies — from pan-Arabism to Arab socialism — had failed to liberate an inch of Arab territory, Islamism, in its Iranian Khomeinist version working through Hezbollah, had achieved “total victory” over Israel in Lebanon. Since 1984 Iran has created branches of Hezbollah in more than 20 countries. None has equalled the success of the Lebanese branch, which until recently enjoyed something akin to cult status among Arabs, including non-Muslims, because of the way it stood up to Israel. It has not even cost Iran very much. Hezbollah was launched with just £13m. After that, according to best estimates, Iran spent £32m to £54m a year on its Lebanese assets. Even if we add the cost of training Hezbollah fighters and equipping them with hardware, Hezbollah (the strongest fighting force in the Middle East after Iran and Israel) has not cost Iran more than £1.3 billion over two decades. According to Naim Kassem, Hezbollah’s number two, the party has an annual budget of £279m, much of which comes from businesses set up by the movement. These include a bank, a mortgage co-operative, an insurance company, a travel agency specialising in pilgrimages to Muslim holy places, several hotels, a chain of supermarkets and a number of urban bus and taxi companies. In its power base in southern Lebanon, particularly south Beirut and the Bekaa valley, it is possible for a visitor to spend a whole week without stepping outside a Hezbollah business unit: the hotel he checks into, the restaurant he eats in, the taxi that takes him around, the guide who shows him the sights and the shop where he buys souvenirs all belong to the party. Hezbollah is a state within the Lebanese state. It controls some 25% of the national territory. Almost 400,000 of Lebanon’s estimated 4m inhabitants live under its control. It collects its own taxes with a 20% levy, known as “khoms”, on all incomes. It runs its own schools, where a syllabus produced in Iran is taught at all levels. It also runs clinics, hospitals, social welfare networks and centres for orphans and widows. The party controls the elected municipal councils and appoints local officials, who in theory should be selected by the central government in Beirut. To complete its status as a virtual state, the party maintains a number of unofficial “embassies”: the one in Tehran is bigger and has a larger number of staff than that of Lebanon itself. Hezbollah also has its own media including a satellite television channel, Al-Manar (the lighthouse), which is watched all over the Arab world, four radio stations, newspapers and magazines plus a book publishing venture. The party has its own system of justice based on sharia and operates its own police force, courts and prisons. Hezbollah runs youth clubs, several football teams and a number of matrimonial agencies. Its relationship with the rest of Lebanon is complex; it occupies 14 seats in the 128-seat national assembly and holds two portfolios in the council of ministers. But it still describes itself as “a people-based movement fighting on behalf of the Muslim world”. The backbone of all that is Hezbollah’s militia, a fighting force of about 8,000 men, trained and armed with the latest weapons by Iran and Syria. Of these about 2,000 men represent an elite force under the direct command of the party’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, a former pupil of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, the man who founded Iran’s Islamic republic. But the party also claims more than 30,000 reservists. Arab and western experts concur that Hezbollah’s militia is a stronger fighting force than the Lebanese army that is supposed to disarm it under United Nations resolution 1559. Also, most soldiers in the official Lebanese army are Shi’ites who would balk at fighting their own. Accounts concerning Hezbollah’s arsenal of weapons vary. The militia is said to be armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and an Iranian rapid-fire gun initially modelled on the Israeli Uzi. The party’s crown jewels, however, are an estimated 14,000 rockets and missiles shipped in from Iran over the past six years. Most of these are modified versions of the Soviet-designed Katyusha. The party also has some Chinese-made Silkworm missiles for special use in naval warfare. “The Israelis would be foolish to think they are dealing with nothing but a bunch of mad fanatics,” says a former Iranian diplomat now in exile. “Hezbollah in Lebanon is a state in all but name: it has its territory, army, civil service and economic and educational systems.” A few minutes’ drive south from central Beirut takes you into what appears to be a different country. Beirut itself has European-style architecture, shops, hotels and cafes with men and women mostly wearing western clothes. Once you enter Hezbollah land, the scene changes. You feel as if you are in Qom, the Iranian holy city, with men sporting bushy beards and women covered by mandatory hijab, milling around in noisy narrow streets fronted by nondescript shops. Billboards that advertise global bands in Beirut are used in Hezbollah land for pasting giant portraits of Khomeini and the Iranian “supreme guide” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Not surprisingly Hezbollah describes its territory as “Dar al-Iman” (House of Faith). When it took over southern Lebanon, Hezbollah found a territory devastated by years of domination by the Palestinian al-Fatah (the area had once been called Fatahland) and the Israeli invasion of 1982. There were almost no schools, no hospitals, few jobs and certainly no security. Hezbollah provided all that. At the same time the movement imposed a strict religious code that gave the poor Shi’ites a sense of moral superiority over other Lebanese who aspired after western lifestyles. A generation of Shi’ites in southern Lebanon has grown up in a world shaped by Hezbollah’s radical ideology. Over the years the Lebanese branch has been woven into Iran’s body politic. Many Hezbollah militants and officials have married into Iranian religious families, often connected to influential ayatollahs. Dozens of Lebanese Shi’ites have worked and continue to work in the Iranian administration, especially in the ministries of security, information and culture. Since the mid-1980s, most of the Lebanese Shi’ite clerics have undertaken training in Iran. In exchange, thousands of Iranian security officers and members of the Revolutionary Guards have lived and worked in Lebanon. As Ali Yunesi, Iran’s former intelligence minister, said: “Iran is Hezbollah and Hezbollah is Iran.” Support for Hezbollah cuts across the political divides within the Iranian ruling establishment. Whether “reformist” or “hardliner”, Iran’s ruling mullahs and their political associates look to Hezbollah as a reflection of their own revolutionary youth. Last week parliamentary members of the Islamic Majlis in Tehran set aside their disputes to unite in their demand to go and fight alongside Hezbollah in Lebanon if Sheikh Nasrallah called them. Why has Tehran decided to play its Lebanese card now? Part of the answer lies in Washington’s decision last May to reverse its policy towards Iran by offering large concessions on its nuclear programme. Tehran interpreted that as a sign of weakness. Ahmadinejad believes that his strategy to drive the “infidel” out of the Islamic heartland cannot succeed unless Arabs accept Iran’s leadership. The problem is that since the Iranian regime is Shi’ite it would not be easy to sell it to most Arabs, who are Sunni. To overcome that hurdle, it is necessary to persuade the Arabs that only Iran is sincere in its desire and capacity to wipe Israel off the map. Once that claim is sold to the Arabs, so Ahmadinejad hopes, they would rally behind his vision of the Middle East instead of the “American vision”. That strategy pushed Israel to the top of Tehran’s agenda. This is why, in May, Tehran became the first country to grant the Hamas government in the occupied territories an emergency grant of £27m to cope with a freeze imposed by European Union aid and other international donations. As moderate Arab countries have distanced themselves from Hamas, Iran along with Syria has stepped in. The pincer war launched by Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel is also related to domestic politics. In the occupied territories, Hamas needs to marginalise Mahmoud Abbas’s PLO and establish itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In Lebanon, Hezbollah wants to prevent the consolidation of power in the hands of a new pro-American coalition government led by Fouad Siniora, the prime minister, and Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader. (Shi’ites make up about 40% of the population, Christians 39% and Sunnis, Druze and others the remainder.) If the pincer war against Israel is won, Iran would be able to expand its zone of influence, already taking shape in Iraq and assured in Syria, to take in Lebanon and Gaza. This would be the first time since the 7th century that Persian power has extended so far to the west. The strategy is high risk. If the Israelis manage to crush Hamas and destroy Hezbollah’s military machine, Iran’s influence will diminish massively. Defeat could revive an internal Hezbollah debate between those who continue to support a total and exclusive alliance with Iran until the infidel, led by America, is driven out of the Middle East and those who want Hezbollah to distance itself from Tehran and emphasise its Lebanese identity. One reason why Hezbollah has found such little support among Arabs in Egypt and Saudi Arabia this time is the perception that it is fighting Israel on behalf of Iran, a Persian Shi’ite power that has been regarded by the majority of Arab Sunnis as an ancestral enemy. In Lebanon, for the first time in two generations, a consensus is emerging among the country’s different ethnic and religious communities that the only way they can live together in peace is by developing a sense of Lebaneseness. This means that Arab Sunnis must abandon their pan-Arab aspirations while Christians must stop looking to France as their “original motherland”. In that context Hezbollah’s Iranian ideology cannot but antagonise the Sunnis, the Druze and the Christians, many of whom are angry at the destruction of their country that Hezbollah has brought about by once again antagonising Israel. The mini war that is taking place between Israel and Hezbollah is, in fact, a proxy war in which Iran’s vision for the Middle East clashes with the administration in Washington. What is at stake is not the exchange of kidnapped Israeli soldiers with Arab prisoners in Israel. Such exchanges have happened routinely over five decades. The real issue is who will set the agenda for the Middle East: Iran or America? http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article...1184_1,00.html |
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ANALYSIS: THE MIDDLE EASTERN VIEW
Why these Arab regimes backed Israel TIMOTHY M. PHELPS July 23, 2006 WASHINGTON - The war in Lebanon has provoked a Middle East realignment in which the most influential Arab regimes have essentially made common cause with Israel against radical Islamic groups. Saudi Arabia, normally the most timid of Arab regimes, boldly denounced the Hezbollah (Party of God) raid into Israel - and was followed by Egypt and Jordan. Never before have these regimes sided with Israel in a conflict between it and any part of the Arab world. One reason: The three countries have all been recent victims of deadly attacks by Islamist groups and have as much to fear from them as Israel does, according to a new analysis gaining growing acceptance among Middle East scholars. Another is that Saudi Arabia, now under the leadership of a new king, had much invested - politically and financially - in the Lebanon it had helped rebuild, parts of which have been reduced to rubble just as they were by the 15-year civil war that ended in 1990. The apparent support for Israel, though more muted as its destruction in Lebanon grows, is likely part of the reason for the Bush administration's unprecedented refusal to call for a cease-fire in a Middle East war and the almost giddy optimism that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reflected Friday when she said, "What we're seeing here [are] the birth pangs of a new Middle East." Today, the growing alliance between the Bush administration (and by proxy the Israelis) and the Saudis on this issue could be cemented into a plan when President George W. Bush and Rice meet with Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi ambassador to the United States and a friend of the president, and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal. But some of the analysts say there is as much room for fear as there is for optimism by Israel, the United States and the three conservative Arab governments - the three parties to this adventure in reshaping the Middle East. As television screens fill with scenes of horror and carnage from Lebanon, the three highly autocratic Arab regimes are coming under mounting criticism inside and outside their boundaries for aligning themselves even for a moment with the perpetrator of all the destruction. Worse is the silent threat from radicalized citizens whose response may be to join the very militant groups the governments are trying to suppress. "These governments are making it sound as if they are urging the Israelis to go ahead and finish off Hezbollah," said Shibley Telhami, an expert on Arab public opinion at the University of Maryland. "My worry is they may be in the midst of a wave of sympathy for Hezbollah that extends" throughout the Arab world. And as Israel moves its troops into Lebanese, the worst may be yet to come. For Israel, the United States and these Arab countries, everything depends on a terrible defeat for Hezbollah, whose currency in the Muslim world is based first on having forced Israel to withdraw from Lebanon in 1990 and now on sending rockets of fear into major Israeli cities like Haifa, which increasingly resemble ghost towns as residents evacuate further south. Despite the degradation of 11 days of bombing and shelling, this result cannot be achieved without a full-scale and possibly costly Israeli invasion of Lebanon or the intervention of a division of heavily armed foreign troops organized by Rice. Anthony Cordesman, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a widely respected Middle East security analyst in Washington, wrote Friday that an Israeli invasion is a "strategic trap" and that a strong international force, while potentially effective, is "very unlikely" to happen because of Lebanese politics. Congressional Middle East analyst Kenneth Katzman said he is optimistic that Israel will defeat Hezbollah, which will have a dramatic effect on Middle East politics. But he said many people are concerned that by destroying Lebanon's infrastructure, "there is a danger that Israel will overplay its hand and build support for Hezbollah" in Lebanon and the rest of the Arab world. Amatzia Baram, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at the University of Haifa in Israel, said Friday that if Hezbollah is not soundly defeated, its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, will become the new Gamal Abdul Nasser, the former Egyptian president who in the 1950s and 1960s united most of the Arab world against Israel. http://www.newsday.com/news/columnis...ting-headlines |
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De premier van Libanon heeft al opgeroepen om de Hezbollah te ontwapenen, dus waar hebben we het dan nog over? Wat je nu aan het doen bent is het soort diplomatieke logica zoals die de val van Srebrenica veroorzaakte; denken dat een lijn op papier belangrijker is dan welk signaal uit de werkelijkheid dan ook. Dat je hoopt daty Syrië zich ergens mee bemoeit vind ik getuigen van onwetendheid. Voor het geval je het nog niet wist: Syrië is het land dat Libanon jarenlang bezet heeft gehouden en de Hezollah aan de macht liet komen. Ze zijn daarmee indirect de oorzaak van dit huidige conflict. Los daarvan is Syrië een dictatuur met een uiterst slechte reputatie op het gebied van democatie en mensenrechten. Overigens heeft Israël al aangegeven dat het akkoord zal gaan met installatie van een sterke troepenmacht van de EU in Libanon. (VN troepen achten ze kennelijk onbetrouwbaar) Citaat:
![]() In tegenstelling tot de terreurorganisaties staan burgerslachtoffers voor Israël wel slecht, niet alleen valt het buitenland dan over ze heen, in tegenstelling tot de Palestijnen staat de gemiddelde Israeli ook niet te juichen op straat als er bloed vloeit (hoewel de afnemende steun voor de Hamas aangeeft dat ook de Palestijnen niet intrinsiek oorlogszuchtig zijn) en dus is het onlogisch om niets te geven om burgerslachtoffers. Bovendien: maakte het ze niets uit, dan hadden ze toch al lang heel Beiroet met de grond gelijk gemaakt? Kan makkelijk, en dan ben je ook zeker dat er geen Hezbollah meer zit. Toch is dat niet gebeurd, in dat licht staat jouw idee van een Israël dat nergens wat om geeft ook best raar. Dus onderbouw het maar eens, je hebt tot nu toe slechts een insinuatie. Citaat:
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Daarnaast is het ook niet goed gesteld met de democratie en mensenrechten in Israel hoor... Citaat:
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of op een gebouw met burgers ipv een brug Citaat:
En het is Israels bedoeling ook niet om aan twee kanten van Syrie te zijn ![]() Citaat:
nonsense. Ze zitten ook in Beiroet. En het vliegveld is - zoals al tig malen uitgelegd - een belangrijk militair doelwit. Ga eens navraag doen bij het leger ofzo. |
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![]() Ik zou opletten met dat soort artikels, barst echt van de fouten. In Saudi, Egypte en Jordanie is er een enorme oppositie tegen Israel hoor. Ool Hassan Nasrallah en zijn banden met andere leiders worden nu overal zwaar overdreven.
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Los daarvan: de ontvoeringsactie begon zijn leven als imagostunt voor de Hamas. De Hamas is namelijk hun steun onder de Palestijnen in rap tempo aan het kwijt raken. Als ze dan met een gevangenruil als helden kunnen worden binnen gehaald kunnen ze die imagoschade reparenen. Israël laat zich echter niet chanteren om daaraan mee te werken en is in plaats daarvan bezig gegaan om vrijlating af te dwingen of tenminste de prijs voor ontvoeringen zo hoog te maken dat zelfs Greta Duisenberg wel twee keer na zou denken alvorens eraan te beginnen. Citaat:
Lees dit artikel anders, daarin wordt prima uitgelegd wat de machtsverhoudingen precies zijn. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5205930.stm Citaat:
De Libanezen zijn in opstand gekomen na de moord op Hariri om van Syrië af te komen, en jouw 'oplossing' is een nieuwe Syrische bezetting? Kom nou zeg, ga Kim Jong Il knuffelen ofzo. Citaat:
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Waar haal je überhaupt deze bewering vandaan? Slap gelul in de ruimte of laat je je informeren door Palestijnse bronnen ofzo? In ieder geval, zinnig was het niet. Maar ja, dat je reageerde met 'gewoon even nadenken' toen ik vroeg om een onderbouwing en/of bewijs geeft al duidelijk aan dat je je betoog niet baseerd op feiten.
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Als alles zo eenzijdig en simplistisch was, dan was er geen conflict. Hamas is waarschijnlijk de minste zorg van Israel, lol. Grappig wel hoe Hamas blijkbaar in de media is uitgegroeid tot de grote slechterik.
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Dat Hezbollah zich 'verschuilt' achter burgers doet daar niks aan af. Citaat:
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Daarnaast heb ik het over de diplomatieke/politieke weg van Libanon voor ontwapening van Hezbollah, aangezien het Libanese leger geen partij is voor Hezbollah Citaat:
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Beide is fout. |
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Ik ga hier niet eens meer verder op in eigenlijk, Gatara; je liegt de boel bij elkaar. Niks, maar dan ook helemaal niks van wat je beweert valt hard te maken. Dan denk je dat hendrixx een vreemde visie heeft, maar jij bent gewoon niks anders dan een dwangmatig leugenaar. Ik walg van je. |
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Nederlands Dagblad, 20/07/2006
Antisemitisch gif bij Hezbollah en Hamas door A. Kamsteeg Waar gaat het om in de huidige crisis tussen Israël enerzijds en de Libanese Hezbollah en de Palestijnse Hamas anderzijds? Uit verschillende commentaren in de westerse wereld blijkt dat de verleiding groot is te denken dat het in die zin om een 'normaal conflict' gaat, dat met wederzijdse compromissen is op te lossen. In een NOVA-uitzending gaf bijvoorbeeld oud-minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Hans van den Broek die indruk. Als Israël de Palestijnen nu maar eens een eigen levensvatbare staat langs de grenzen van vóór de Zesdaagse Oorlog van 1967 zou geven... Nu zullen slechts weinig mensen ontkennen dat van blijvende Israëlische controle over grote delen van de Westelijke Jordaanoever, inclusief Oost-Jeruzalem, een provocerend effect uitgaat naar de Arabische wereld. Maar men onderschat het ideologische, zo men wil religieuze element in het conflict als ervan wordt uitgegaan dat Hezbollah en Hamas tevreden zijn gesteld als er naast Israël een Palestijnse staat is gekomen. Ten diepste zijn beide organisaties namelijk niet alleen antizionistisch, maar zelfs antisemitisch, of beter: anti-joods. Toen in het begin van de Tweede Wereldoorlog de grootmoefti (islamitisch geleerde) van Jeruzalem Jaj Amin Al Husseini en de Iraakse leider Rasjid Ali al-Gailani blijk gaven van hun sympathie met het nazi-regime in Berlijn, waren zij aanvankelijk toch enigszins verontrust over het antisemitische taalgebruik van Hitler. Behoorden zij, Arabieren, zelf ook niet tot de familie van semieten? Maar professor Walter Gross, directeur van het Bureau voor Rassenpolitiek van de nationaal-socialisten, stelde de moefti en Rashid Ali gerust: antisemitisch was bij de nazi's exclusief anti-joods. Dat gif zit er ook bij Hezbollah en Hamas. Met twee maten Nu zijn er vrienden van de Joodse staat die iemand al snel van antisemitisme beschuldigen als er kritiek wordt geoefend op onderdelen van Israëlisch beleid. Daarmee lopen ze het risico niet langer serieus te worden genomen. Tegelijk maakt het duidelijk dat het nodig blijft te zeggen wat we onder antisemitisme, anti-joods zijn, verstaan. Twee elementen zijn in dat verband vooral van belang. Antisemitisme kenmerkt zich in de eerste plaats door het feit dat Joden met andere ethische maatstaven worden gemeten dan andere volken. Klassiek is wat dat betreft een voorbeeld geworden uit het begin van de jaren tachtig. Overal in de wereld was toen sprake van grote verontwaardiging over de slachting die door Israël gesteunde milities van Libanese maronitische (christelijke) milities aanrichtten in de Palestijnse vluchtelingenkampen Sabra en Shatila: achthonderd doden. In 1982 vervolgens vielen Syrische troepen de Syrische stad Hama aan. Ze doodden er niet alleen leden van de rivaliserende Moslim Broederschap, maar bovendien minstens 20.000 burgers. Toen echter was er een 'oorverdovend' internationaal stilzwijgen. En vandaag de dag? Er bestaat veel aversie ten opzichte van de Joodse lobby in Amerika. Maar waarom dan niet ook tegenover de Arabische, Armeense of Ierse pressiegroepen in Washington? Iemand wordt echter nog geen antisemiet als hij ten nadele van Joden met twee maten meet. Trouwens, niet alleen Joden worden gediscrimineerd. De westerse houding ten opzichte van alle mogelijke ellende in Afrika is in dit verband ontstellend. Stel je maar eens voor... Als Darfur ergens op het noordelijk halfrond had gelegen... Als bij ons, in het Westen, zoveel mensen aan aids zouden sterven... Alles zou uit de kast worden getrokken om daaraan een einde te maken. Daarom is er bij antisemitisme nog iets anders aan de hand. Antisemiet is hij die de Jood demoniseert door hem ervan te beschuldigen de oorzaak van wereldwijd kwaad te zijn. Demoniseren In verband met het demoniseren van Joden past Europa uiteraard de nodige bescheidenheid. Hoe vaak werd de Jood er in de oude christelijke kerk immers niet van beschuldigd Christus te hebben vermoord? Dat theologische verwijt vormde een belangrijke factor achter inquisitie, pogroms en holocaust. Van de zestiende eeuw in Spanje tot in de twintigste eeuw in Duitsland werd van burgers gevraagd dat zij zouden bewijzen christen te zijn door enkele generaties 'bloedzuiverheid' aan te tonen. Voor Hitler c.s. waren de Joden de oorsprong van alle kwaad. Groepen als Hezbollah en Hamas hebben dit kosmisch georiënteerde antisemitisme overgenomen. Het Handvest van Hamas stelt dat ,,de Joden'' verantwoordelijk zijn voor het ,,aanstoken van revoluties'', ,,het vernietigen van samenlevingen'' en ,,het uitbuiten van landen''. ,,Joden stonden achter de Eerste en de Tweede Wereldoorlog.'' Zij wilden een ,,Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties om de wereld te kunnen besturen.'' Volgens Hamas ,,brak nooit ergens een oorlog uit zonder dat er Joodse vingerafdrukken op stonden.'' Joden belichamen het kwaad in de wereld. Bij de vanuit Iran in het leven geroepen Hezbollah is dat niet veel anders. Officiële Iraanse media noemen de Joden een ,,subversief element in de geschiedenis'', ,,satanisch en onmenselijk'', terwijl de holocaust een bedenksel van de Joden zou zijn. Een studie van een Libanese sjiitische geleerde (Amal Saad-Ghorayeb: Hezbollah: Politics and Religion) noemt Hezbollah niet alleen anti-Israël, maar wel degelijk ook theologisch anti-joods. Voor Hezbollah hebben Joden naar hun aard slechtere eigenschappen dan anderen. Judaïsme (het joodse geloof) is duivels. Zelfs in het pro-Arabische Frankrijk werd de met Hezbolla gelieerde Libanese zender Al Manar wegens antisemitisme verboden. De crisis in het Midden-Oosten bevat inderdaad obstakels die ook bij andere conflicten een rol spelen en die met een combinatie van diplomatie, economische instrumenten en militaire macht wellicht zijn op te ruimen. Maar er is ook sprake van antisemitisme, van jodenhaat. Juist dat maakt de crisis misschien wel onoplosbaar. |
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